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Abstract
In this work we investigated user authentication on mobile devices using touch behavior and micro movements of the device. The
novelty of our work lies in the collection of user behavior data during the ﬁlling in of a psychological questionnaire (implemented
as an Android application). In order to answer the questions, users were required to use a slider. Therefore users were constrained
to using only straight horizontal swipes. Extensive evaluations were conducted on the resulting dataset using one- and two-class
classiﬁcation algorithms. Although authentication EER based on single swipe is around 4%, this was improved by using sequences
of 5 swipes (0.2% EER). Features related to micro movement of the device proved to be the most discriminating ones.
c© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
Published by Elsevier Ltd. Peer-review under responsibility of the “Petru Maior” University of Tirgu-Mures, Faculty of Engineer-
ing.
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1. Introduction
There has been a huge increase in the use of touchscreen based mobile devices in people’s everyday life. People
store personal information on these devices, hence protecting user data is of paramount importance.
Mobile devices simplify the collection of some behavioral biometric data due to their powerful sensors. The way
people use their touchscreen devices yields new types of behavioral biometrics. Several research studies have analyzed
touch behavior in terms of new biometrics and the applicability of touch behavior for continuous authentication,
indicating the huge potential in this type of biometric. None of the previous studies have exploited the full range of
user speciﬁc features extractable from data collected from mobile devices.
In this paper we analyze touchscreen and motion data collected through a psychological questionnaire in order to
determine the user identity. The main research questions of this study are as follows:
• Is it possible to authenticate the user through constrained swipes on touchscreen-based mobile devices?
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(a) Personal data (b) Questionnaire
Fig. 1: Android application: Psychological questionnaire.
• How many swipes are necessary to accurately authenticate a user?
• Which set of features is the most discriminative?
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related work. Section 3 presents data collection,
feature extraction and the authentication framework used in this study. Section 4 describes the datasets used in
experiments and the obtained results. Section 5 concludes the study and presents future research directions.
2. Related work
In the last few years there has been an explosion in the study of touch biometrics. The importance of these
type of behavioral biometrics is supported by the rapidly growing spread of touchscreen based smartphones. Some
early research constructed user proﬁles based on general touch dynamics/behavior [1], [2], [3]. Other researchers
constructed phone unlock systems based on touch sequences [4], [5], but none of these two studies used touchscreen
speciﬁc features, such as pressure or ﬁnger area.
Some researchers have investigated characteristics of scrolling interactions [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11]. These
studies reported the necessity of using more than one swipe for accurate user authentication. Authentication using
multitouch gestures were also studied [12], [13]. Phone usage behavior was captured by motion sensors and added to
touchscreen usage behavior by Bo et al. in their SilentSense system [14]. They analyzed authentication in both static
and dynamic scenarios (the user using mobile phone while in motion).
The novelty of our data collection method consists of collecting spatial, touch and motion data through a personality
questionnaire in which users are required to use a slider in order to answer the questions. Utilizing a slider, all of the
swipes are constrained straight swipes, in contrast to those used in previous studies.
3. Materials and methods
3.1. Data collection and feature extraction
In this paper we analyzed touch data collected through the Hungarian 58-question Eysenck Personality Question-
naire. An Android application was implemented in order to collect users’ behavioral data during the ﬁlling in of the
questionnaire. In order to answer the questions, users had to use a slider. Therefore for each answer they made a
horizontal swipe on the touchscreen (see Fig. 1 (b)). Besides touchscreen data - such as touch position, pressure and
ﬁnger area - accelerometer data were also collected and user speciﬁc features were extracted from the raw data.
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Table 1: Details of data acquisition.
Information Description
Number of subjects 40
Number of samples 2729 (at least 58 samples/subject)
Device Nexus 7 tablet
Number of swipes/question unlimited
Controlled acquisition Yes
Age range 20-49 (average: 25.92)
Gender 22 male, 18 female
Touchscreen experience 5 (level 1), 3 (level 2), 9 (level 3), 11 (level 4), 12 (level 5)
We deﬁne a swipe as a sequence of touch points from a touch down until a touch release event. In each touch
point the following raw data were captured: touch action, x coordinate, y coordinate, x gravity, y gravity, z gravity,
the pressure exerted, and the area occluded between ﬁnger and screen (ﬁnger area). All this information was obtained
from the standard Android API, where touch action has three distinct values: ACTION UP, ACTION MOVE and
ACTION DOWN. Based on these action values the raw data were divided into swipes, and then features were ex-
tracted. Sometimes more than one swipe resulted during an answer. The following 11 features were extracted from
each swipe:
• duration: the time between touch down and touch release;
• length of trajectory: the length of the segment deﬁned by the two endpoints. It is computed as the sum of
sub-segment length. A sub-segment is a segment between two consecutive touch points;
• average velocity: it is computed as a fraction of the length of trajectory and duration;
• accelerationatstart: it is computed as the average acceleration at the ﬁrst 4 touch points;
• midstrokpressure: the pressure at the middle point of the swipe;
• midstrokeﬁngerarea: the ﬁnger area at the middle point of the swipe;
• meanpressure: the average of pressures in touch points;
• meanﬁngerarea: the average of ﬁnger areas in touch points;
• meangx: the average of x gravities in touch points;
• meangy: the average of y gravities in touch points;
• meangz: the average of z gravities in touch points;
Details regarding data acquisition are presented in Table 1. Data was collected from 40 subjects, at least 58
samples/subject (the questionnaire contains 58 questions).
3.2. Authentication methods
An authentication system always has to decide whether a sample or a sequence of samples belongs to the genuine
user or not. In pattern recognition or machine learning context, a two-class classiﬁer can be employed for authentica-
tion systems if negative samples (impostor data) are available, otherwise one-class classiﬁers should be used. Several
one-class classiﬁers were evaluated, such as the Parzen density estimator, the nearest-neighbor, Gaussian mixtures
method and Support Vector Data Description method. Regarding two-class classiﬁcation we chose to evaluate Ran-
dom Forests, Bayes Net and k-nearest neighbors (k-NN).
In order to construct two-class classiﬁers for authentication purposes, one has to select both positive and negative
samples. Positive samples are always from the legitimate user and negative ones from impostors. In order to use
a class-balanced set for evaluation purpose, we selected all samples from a given user as positive samples, and two
random samples from every other user as negative samples. For evaluation we used 10-fold cross-validation, namely
90% of the data was used for training and 10% of the data for testing and this was repeated for each fold combina-
tion. To get a more accurate result, we repeated the above evaluations 10 times (10 runs), using a diﬀerent seed for
randomization in each run.
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The above procedure was applied also in the evaluation of one-class classiﬁers, except that only positive samples
were used in the training phase.
Authentication results are presented using Equal Error Rate (EER) with conﬁdence bounds and Detection Error
Trade-oﬀ (DET) curves [15]. For DET curves one has to compute scores for positive and for negative samples. We
used classiﬁers which, in addition to the classiﬁcation decision, yield a score (likelihood value), which indicates the
measure of being part of the positive class. DET curves are plotted by varying the decision threshold of the classiﬁer
across the ordered classiﬁer output scores. Each presented DET error curve is an averaged error curve, based on
4000 evaluation (10 times x 10 folds x 40 users), and was calculated by using the perfcurve function from MATLAB
(Statistics Toolbox, MATLAB, The Mathworks, Inc., Natick, MA).
Evaluation was performed several times, each time using a diﬀerent length swipe sequence. Let us denote by
C a trained classiﬁer and X = {x+1 , x+2 , . . . , x+N1 , x−1 , x−2 , . . . , x−N2 }, xi ∈ RD the testing set containing N1 positive and N2
negative samples, where D is the number of features. We compute the scores for each swipe using the trained classiﬁer
C. Let us denote P = {p+1 , p+2 , . . . p+N1 , p−1 , p−2 , . . . p−N2 } the set of scores obtained.
The prediction score for a swipe sequence was computed by averaging the scores for each swipe. Let us denote by
k the length of the swipe sequence used for authentication purpose. Then, we can form N1−k+1 sequences containing
positive samples: S i = {x+i , x+i+1, . . . x+i+k−1}, i = 1,N1 − k + 1. The scores for these sequences were computed using
formula p(S i) =
∑i+k−1
j=i p
+
j
k . Sequences of negative samples were treated similarly.
4. Results
4.1. Datasets
All the measurements were performed on the following three datasets:
• dataset 11f, all 11 features
• dataset 8f, 8 touch features: duration, length of trajectory, average velocity, accelerationatstart, midstrokpres-
sure, midstrokeﬁngerarea, meanpressure, meanﬁngerarea
• dataset 3f, 3 gravity features: meangx, meangy, meangz
Datasets were normalized (range 0-1) in order to be used with classiﬁers sensible to features belonging to various
numerical ranges.
4.2. Authentication
Two-class classiﬁers were used from the WEKA Data Mining Software package [16] with the following parame-
ters: 100 trees in the case of Random Forests, default settings for the Bayes Net classiﬁer and k = 1 for the nearest
neighbors (k-NN) classiﬁer. With respect to one-class classiﬁers, the Dd tools Toolbox [17] was used, with classi-
ﬁer parameters selected after some preliminary optimization tests as follows: default values for the Parzen density
estimator (parzendd), two mixtures for the positive class in case of Mixture of Gaussians (mogdd), k = 3 for the
nearest-neighbor data description and exponential kernel (P = 0.1) for the incremental Support Vector Data Descrip-
tion (incsvdd).
All of the experiments were performed by cross-validation methods (described in section 3) for both two- and one-
class classiﬁers and as a main measure for these tasks we used the mean EER value with conﬁdence bounds across
users and test folds.
Results of authentication experiments formulated for two-class classiﬁers are presented in Table 2 and Fig. 2. For
two-class classiﬁers the average of gravity features (dataset 3f) already assured a reasonable authentication for one
swipe (0.054±0.144 for the k-NN classiﬁer), which was gradually improved for all classiﬁers by using the average
scores of 2-5 consecutive swipes, achieving ﬁnally 0.004±0.001 EER value for the Random Forests classiﬁer. The 8
touch feature group (dataset 8f) produced the poorest performance among our feature sets, but even this one achieved
an EER value of 0.016±0.016 for ﬁve swipes. The 11-feature set gave the best results for the two-class classiﬁer
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group, achieving EER values between 0.044±0.020 – 0.107±0.143 for one swipe, and 0.002±0.000 – 0.016±0.035
for 5 swipes.
As for the one-class classiﬁcation algorithms (see Table 3 and Fig. 3), they usually performed better for small
feature sets if these were discriminative. The best results were obtained for the 3 gravity feature set for all four
classiﬁers (considering a single swipe). The best EER value was obtained for the knndd classiﬁer (0.065±0.054).
Large conﬁdence bounds show that variance among users is high for the one-class classiﬁers. Consecutive swipes
reduced the EER value only for the distance based classiﬁers (knndd and incsvdd), but yielded no better results for
density methods (parzendd and mogdd), except a slight improvement in the case of 11 features (parzendd). The best
EER value for 5 swipes (0.023±0.019) was achieved for the incsvdd classiﬁer.
Table 2: Two-class classiﬁcation. Authentication EERs with conﬁdence bounds. Swipe sequences of length: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.
Num NumSwipes
Classiﬁer Features 1 2 3 4 5
Bayes Net 3 0.067 ± 0.062 0.032 ± 0.026 0.015 ± 0.019 0.0009 ± 0.011 0.005 ± 0.017
k-NN 3 0.054 ± 0.144 0.071 ± 0.029 0.015 ± 0.038 0.0170 ± 0.012 0.005 ± 0.054
Random forests 3 0.057 ± 0.041 0.025 ± 0.014 0.010 ± 0.016 0.0050 ± 0.019 0.004 ± 0.001
Bayes Net 8 0.185 ± 0.048 0.113 ± 0.044 0.087 ± 0.038 0.0059 ± 0.036 0.046 ± 0.033
k-NN 8 0.193 ± 0.143 0.281 ± 0.058 0.102 ± 0.077 0.1450 ± 0.041 0.060 ± 0.054
Random forests 8 0.138 ± 0.035 0.076 ± 0.027 0.043 ± 0.025 0.0250 ± 0.022 0.016 ± 0.016
Bayes Net 11 0.056 ± 0.029 0.018 ± 0.024 0.011 ± 0.019 0.0005 ± 0.068 0.005 ± 0.013
k-NN 11 0.107 ± 0.143 0.115 ± 0.028 0.037 ± 0.038 0.0280 ± 0.037 0.016 ± 0.035
Random forests 11 0.044 ± 0.020 0.010 ± 0.011 0.005 ± 0.084 0.0050 ± 0.021 0.002 ± 0.000
Table 3: One-class classiﬁcation. Authentication EERs with conﬁdence bounds. Swipe sequences of length: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.
Num NumSwipes
Classiﬁer Features 1 2 3 4 5
knndd 3 0.065 ± 0.054 0.045 ± 0.045 0.030 ± 0.023 0.025 ± 0.018 0.024 ± 0.020
mogdd 3 0.106 ± 0.037 0.120 ± 0.039 0.133 ± 0.039 0.137 ± 0.039 0.136 ± 0.040
parzendd 3 0.072 ± 0.047 0.070 ± 0.044 0.072 ± 0.045 0.071 ± 0.041 0.073 ± 0.037
incsvdd 3 0.084 ± 0.049 0.056 ± 0.037 0.038 ± 0.021 0.027 ± 0.019 0.023 ± 0.019
knndd 8 0.213 ± 0.039 0.180 ± 0.037 0.158 ± 0.041 0.149 ± 0.039 0.139 ± 0.039
mogdd 8 0.234 ± 0.054 0.216 ± 0.065 0.225 ± 0.076 0.234 ± 0.083 0.239 ± 0.096
parzendd 8 0.215 ± 0.039 0.208 ± 0.041 0.211 ± 0.049 0.214 ± 0.053 0.213 ± 0.055
incsvdd 8 0.217 ± 0.041 0.175 ± 0.041 0.142 ± 0.041 0.119 ± 0.038 0.104 ± 0.036
knndd 11 0.090 ± 0.027 0.069 ± 0.021 0.049 ± 0.018 0.046 ± 0.018 0.045 ± 0.020
mogdd 11 0.114 ± 0.031 0.107 ± 0.092 0.118 ± 0.113 0.130 ± 0.113 0.143 ± 0.117
parzendd 11 0.092 ± 0.030 0.073 ± 0.035 0.074 ± 0.038 0.077 ± 0.034 0.078 ± 0.033
incsvdd 11 0.093 ± 0.027 0.059 ± 0.023 0.041 ± 0.019 0.029 ± 0.018 0.025 ± 0.016
5. Conclusions
Though it may be inadvisable to implement an authentication procedure using only a slider and some control
questions, these results suggest, that constrained horizontal swipe movements have the potential to yield good authen-
tication results for both one- and two-class classiﬁers.
On the one hand, the best EER values achieved for single swipes (around 0.05) will not permit implementation of
an authentication procedure. On the other hand, classiﬁer performance was improved (except for one-class density
based classiﬁers) by using the average scores of consecutive swipes. Consequently, using 5 consecutive swipes in the
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Fig. 2: DET curves, two-class authentication, Random Forests classiﬁer.
case of our datasets produced a good EER value (0.002±0.000 for the 11-feature set and 0.004±0.001 for the 3-feature
set) by using two class-classiﬁcation (Random Forests classiﬁer), so authentication is possible if impostor samples are
available. Secondly, in case of missing impostor samples, the distance based one-class classiﬁers achieved good EER
values (knndd: 0.024±0.020, parzendd: 0.023±0.019). These results could be further improved, if users with bad
authentication results are excluded during the enrollment phase of an authentication system (with the proposal of
using other biometric methods).
Surprisingly, the most discriminative features were the features calculated as the average of x, y and z gravities.
Though two-class classiﬁers generally perform poorly on smaller feature sets, they achieved good results even for a
single swipe on these 3 features, close to the 11-feature set results (the k-NN classiﬁer performed even better than for
the 11-feature set). We conclude that device movement and holding position are the most user speciﬁc information
(all feature selection algorithms conﬁrmed this, the best touch features, like accelerationatstart and duration, generally
appeared behind the gravity features - data not shown in this study). Feature sets which contained no information
recorded from the accelerometer performed generally poorer, this is visible also from the results of the 8-feature set.
In the case of distance based one-class algorithms, the best results were obtained by using the 3-feature set, in addition,
the mean EER could not be improved by adding touch features (except for improvement in the conﬁdence interval,
which became narrower). The worst results were obtained by using only touch features in the case of one-class
classiﬁers.
Two-class classiﬁcation methods also yielded a high accuracy concerning error rates both on the positive and
negative class, meanwhile all one-class methods showed better performance on classifying the negative class than the
positive class, however the scores were usable for expressing good EER results.
In the near future we plan to continue data collection and correlate user speciﬁc EER with user’s personality type.
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Fig. 3: DET curves, one-class authentication, knndd (1 swipe) and incsvdd (5 swipes) classiﬁers.
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